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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CLAUDE DENNIS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD 
CO~iP ANY, a corporation, 
Defendant arnd Appella.nl. 
Case 
No. 9543 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action under the Federal Employers Lia-
bility Act for personal injuries claimed to have been 
sustained by the plaintiff \Yhile in the course of his em-
ployment with the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury. At the close of 
plaintiff's evidence the defendant moved the court for a 
directed verdict. The court denied defendant's motion 
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and submitted the case to the jury. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of plaintiff and against the employer, 
assessed damages at $20,000, diminished the award by 
one-half for contributory negligence, and entered a net 
verdict of $10,000. The court entered judgment on the 
verdict. Defendant thereupon moved the court for judg-
ment n.o.v. or in the alternative for a new trial. These 
motions were denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in its favor as a matter of la,v, or that failing, a new 
trial. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
On January 2, 1960, two ''open joints'' \Yere reported 
to the defendant railroad company on its main line near 
Green River, Utah (R. 221). [_A_n open joint is a separa-
tion between adjoining lengths of rail caused by contrac-
tion of the rails sufficient to break the connection between 
them. The metal rails expand in warm \veather and con-
tract in cold weather.] Since the existence of an open 
joint constitutes a serious hazard to rail traffic, a sec-
tion cre''T \vas dispatched to each joint to make immediate 
repair. The plaintiff, Dennis, \Yas a member of one of 
these section crews. He claims damages for the freezing 
of two fingers \V hile exposed to the \Yeather during the 
repair operations. 
Dennis and his fello\v section men, Burnett and Carb-
jal, and their foreman, Chronopoulos, ""'ere called to work 
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about 5:00 o'clock P.M. (R. 94). Efforts were made to 
get a fifth man who occasionally worked with the same 
crew, but he could not be located (R. 196). 
The men left Green River, Utah for the site of the 
open joint about 5:30 o'clock P.M. (R. 197). The repair 
site was about 18 miles from Green River. The men 
traveled by truck until they met the signal maintainer who 
was on the track in a motor truck. They then traveled 
on the track car about 3;4 mile to the open joint. Upon 
arriving, Dennis walked back to the highway to find a 
path for the truck and then up the highway to the truck 
(R. 136). He then drove the truck down the highway and 
over to the open joint (R. 136). Upon arriving at the 
repair site with the truck, Dennis and Burnett split 
up a tie they had brought in the back of the truck and 
built a fire (R. 136). When this fire burned out, the men 
built another (R. 148). During the course of the repair 
operations the men would come over to the fire to warm 
themselves when they got cold. Dennis testified that he 
was free to go over to the fire if he got cold and that there 
was no one who knew better than he when he was cold 
enough to require the warmth of the fire (R. 148, 149). 
The weather was cold. There was snow on the ground 
and the wind was blowing. The records of the U. S. 
Weather Bureau disclosed that at 5 :00 o'clock P.M. on 
January 2, 1960, at Green River, Utah it was 10° F. and 
that at 5 :00 o'clock A.M. the following morning it was 
-5° F. (Exhibit 3-P). 
Dennis was not as warmly dressed as the other mem-
bers of the crew. He was the only one who did not have 
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overshoes on (R. 132) and the other members of the crew 
were wearing woolen mittens, but Dennis was wearing 
canvas gloves (R. 132, 133). He wore a canvas glove next 
to the hand and a rubberized glove over that. Each em-
ployee furnishes his own clothing and Dennis testified 
that he provided himself with what he :figured was suffi-
cient clothing to protect him against the cold (R. 133). 
There is no claim that the defendant had a duty to clothe 
the plaintiff or to see that the clothing he had was suffi-
cient to protect against the existing weather. 
The object of the crew's \Vork in repairing the open 
joint was to close the gap between the rails at the joint 
in question and to secure the rails together by re-bolting 
the angle irons which originally held them in place. This 
is done by loosening several rails on both sides of the 
open joint and prying the rails toward the joint until it 
closes. The joint is then secured by angle irons bolted 
to the sides of the rails. 
Since the track where the repairs were being made 
\vas the main line, it had to be kept open for service during 
the repair operations. This is done by placing a small 
piece of rail, called a dutchman, in the opening over which 
trains can pass at reduced speeds until the joint is closed. 
At one point in the trial plaintiff's counsel suggested by 
his questions that permanent repairs could a"Tait a more 
convenient time so long as a dutchman was placed in the 
track. In railroading an open joint is considered an 
emergency which must be corrected immediately (R. 229). 
The use of a dutchman is strictly a temporary measure 
since there are dangers to rail traffic inherent in its use 
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( R. 229, 230) and since it seriously slows and impedes 
rail traffic ( R. 231). The Green River main line carries 
scheduled passenger trains, including the Cailifornia 
Zephyr and the Prospector, and also seYeral classified 
high-speed freight trains (R. 224-227). Time is a vital 
element in railroading because trains run on published 
schedules and interchange with other railroad lines. 
Traffic on the entire intercontinental line is affected by 
delays of each connecting carrier. Delays affect not only 
the transportation of passengers but all kinds of merchan-
dise and perishable food and commodities. The railroad 
was required to close the open joint as soon as possible. 
Dennis intermittently worked on the line and warmed 
himself by the fire. He testified that at about midnight he 
laid a wrench down by the fire and that ''two fingers were 
clamped shut and I had to pull them apart like that before 
I could get my glove off'' (R. 108). He said that he re-
marked, ''it looks like my hand's frozen to that wrench.'' 
This is the only remark which Dennis claims to have made 
about his hand or fingers while he was on the job. Dennis 
further testified that he continued to work until about 
4 :00 o'clock A.M. and that the men returned to Green 
River about 5:00 o'clock A.M. (R. 111). Chronopoulos, 
the foreman, testified that at about midnight Dennis com-
plained of the cold and the foreman ''told him I thought 
that it would be better for him to get in the cab of the 
truck where it was warmer and let the man in the truck 
come out and help us" (R. 200). According to the fore-
man, Dennis went over and got into the truck where 
there was a heater going, and he remained there the rest 
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of the night (R. 200). Both of the other laborers also tes-
tified that Dennis got into the truck about midnight and 
remained there until completion of the job (R. 182, 189). 
Dennis admitted that he got into the truck toward the end 
of the job but testified that it was after midnight and said 
that ''as near as I can remember'' he was not in the truck 
"over thirty minutes altogether" (R. 144). 
When he got home Dennis noticed a tingling numb-
ness and discoloration in the fingers of his left hand. He 
went to a doctor and later his left little finger and middle 
finger were surgically removed for frostbite. 
At the trial plaintiff called Dr. Reed Clegg, who tes-
tified on hypothetical facts that Dennis had suffered from 
frostbite. On cross examination, Dr. Clegg testified that 
inadequate clothing, and in particular cold feet, would 
contribute to lowering of body temperature and thus to 
frostbite on vulnerable members of the body (R. 165). 
He further testified that adequate clothing can protect 
against any weather condition. 
At the close of the plaintiff's case the defendant 
moved the court for a directed verdict on the ground 
that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the 
railroad company and that the undisputed eYidence dem-
onstrated that the cause of plaintiff's frostbite 'Yas his 
own failure to properly clothe and protect himself from 
the cold. The court denied this motion and subsequently 
denied defendant's motions for judgment n.o.v. and new 
trial. Defendant contends that the court erred in sub-
mitting the case to the jury, in instructing the jury, and 
in failing to grant defendant's motions after the trial. 
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ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
rr!-IER11~ \\T_.\_S NO EVIDI£XCE OF AN"Y XF~G­
LIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DE-
Fl~XD_.\KT, AND THE COURT ERRED IX 
REFUSING TO GRANrr DEFENDANT'S 
l\IOTIO~S FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 1\_~;D 
JUDG~lENT N.O.V. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY THAT THERE WAS NO EVI-
DENCE FROl\I WHICH THEY COULD FIND 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT-
LY EXPOSED TO THE COLD LONGER 
THAN WAS REASONABLY NECESSARY. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY THAT THERE WAS NO EVI-
DENCE FROl\I WHICH DEFENDANT 
COULD BE FOUND NEGLIGENT IN FAIL-
ING TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFF WITH SUF-
FICIENT HELP. 
Points I, IV and V will be considered together under 
one heading because they relate to the question of whether 
or not there was any evidence of negligence on the part of 
the railroad. 
It has been stated by the court on many occasions 
that Federal Employers Liability Act does not impose 
liability without fault. Before the railroad can be found 
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liable, there must be some evidence that the railroad was 
negligent. This proposition is well stated in Wilkerson v. 
McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69 Sup. Ct. 413, wherein Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, speaking for the court said: 
''The easy but timid way out for a trial judge is 
to leave all cases tried to a jury for jury determi-
nation, but in so doing he fails in his duty to take 
a case from the jury when the evidence would not 
warrant a verdict by it. A timid judge, like a 
biased judge, is intrinsically a lawless judge. 
These observations are especially pertinent to 
suits under the Federal Employers Liability Act.'' 
The same rule is stated in Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 
320 U. S. 476, 64 Sup. Ct. 232, wherein Mr. Justice Reed 
speaking for a majority of the court said: 
''The weight of the evidence under the Employers 
Liability Act must be more than a scintilla before 
the case may be properly left to the discretion of 
the trier of fact - in this case, the jury. (Citing 
cases) VVhen the evidence is such that ~thout 
weighing the credibility of the witnesses there can 
be but one reasonable conclusion as to the ver-
dict, the court should determine the proceeding by 
non-suit, directed verdict or other"-ise in accord-
ance \Yith the applicable practice "~ithout submis-
sion to the jury, or by judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. By such direction of the trial the re-
sult is saYed from the mischance of speculation 
over legally unfounded claims. (Citing cases) ... 
The rule as to "Then a directed Yerdict is proper, 
heretofore referred to, is applicable to questions of 
proximate cause (Citing rases) ... Liability ar·ises 
from negligence n.ot fro Jn in.iury under th·is Act. 
And that negligence must be the cause of the in-
jury (Citing cases)." 
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rThe only case involving cold weather exposure which 
has gone to the U. S. Supreme Court is Anderson v. Atchi-
son T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1948), 68 Sup. Ct. 854, 333 U. S. 
821. That ease concerned the alleged wrongful death of 
a railroad employee who brought suit under the Federal 
Employers Liability Act. The complaint alleged that the 
decedent was a conductor. While the train was moving 
past a station, the decedent fell from the rear vestibule 
where he was required to be in the performance of his 
duties. This fall resulted in injuries which rendered him 
helpless. When the train passed the next station, it was 
noted that he had disappeared. Notwithstanding this fact 
nothing was done until the train passed three more sta-
tions. It was alleged that defendant negligently and care-
lessly failed to transmit any message of the conductor's 
disappearance for an unreasonable length of time and 
'vhen the message was finally sent, the defendant negli-
gently and carelessly failed to make a reasonable and 
immediate search. After the conductor was found lying 
on the ground in a helpless condition, he was taken to a 
hospital where he died three days later from exposure to 
the very cold weather. The trial court held that even 
assuming the allegations of plaintiff's complaint to be 
true, it nevertheless did not state facts showing that the 
railroad was negligent. 
The California Supreme Court sustained the trial 
court with two Judges dissenting. The Supreme Court of 
the United States reversed holding: 
"It thus appears that we have a complaint 'vhich 
charges that a conductor disappears from a mov-
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ing train in bitter cold weather at a time when 
his duty requires him to be on the rear vestibule, 
his absence is discovered, and efforts of any kind 
to ascertain and save him from his probable peril 
are not promptly made by other train employees, 
the only persons likely to know of his disappear-
ance and the probable dangers incident to it. \V e 
are unable to agree that had petitioner been per-
mitted to introduce all evidence relevant under 
her allegations, the facts would have revealed a 
situation as to which a jury under appropriate 
instructions could not have found that decedent's 
exposure and consequent death \Yere due 'in ''Thole 
or in part' to failure of respondent's agents to 
do \vhat 'a reasonable and prudent man would 
ordinarily have done under the circumstances of 
the situation.' '' 
The Anderson case supra is not analogous to the in-
stant case. The negligence in the Anderson case consist-
ed of failing to take reasonable action after the railroad 
knew or should have known of the deceased's disappear-
ance. In the instant case, the negligence complained 
of by the plaintiff consists only of requiring the plaintiff, 
Mr. Dennis, along with other employees to make emer-
gency repairs during a cold night. It is not contended that 
it was negligence for the railroad to make such repairs 
during the night in question. Appellant's specific con-
tentions of negligence are contained in the trial court's 
instruction No. 2, excerpts of \Yhich are as follows : 
1. Requiring the plaintiff unreasonably to work 
in unusually severe and cold \Yeather over a 
long period of time. 
2. Failure to furnish the plaintiff with adequate 
\varming facilities. 
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3. Failure to provide sufficient help. 
A case which is somewhat analogous is Gulf, Colo-
rado & San.ta Fe Ry. Co. v. Waterhouse (1949), 223 S.W. 
2d 654. In that case, the plaintiff suffered a heat stroke 
while working for the defendant railroad. The plaintiff 
introduced evidence relative to certain acts of negligence 
'vhich were similar to the acts of negligence claimed by 
the plaintiff in the instant case. In addition to these acts 
of negligence, he also claimed that the foreman required 
him to return to work after he complained to the foreman 
that he was getting too hot. The Texas court held that 
the jury could properly return a verdict on the ground of 
negligence based upon the foreman's insistence that the 
plaintiff return to work after the plaintiff had complained 
of the heat but stated that the other grounds of negligence 
alleged did not constitute negligence against the railroad. 
The court said : 
''Points 1 to 5, inclusive, are overruled. The find-
ings of the jury established two grounds of negli-
gence, to wit, (Issue 4) in assigning to Plaintiff 
such duties as were assigned to him on the after-
noon of August 13, 1947, and (Issue 8) in directing 
Plaintiff to continue working after he had told his 
foreman that he was getting too hot. We hold that 
the finding of negligence under Issue 8 and the 
relevant finding of proximate cause under Issue 9 
were supported by the proof. If the finding under 
Issue 4 refers to the act of the foreman in setting 
the plaintiff to work cutting brush when the gang 
returned to work after eating dinner, as it pre-
sumably does, then we hold that it "\Vas not sup-
ported by the proof. 
:JI: • • • 
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[2-4] (2) It was not enough on this record 
that Plaintiff was injured by reason of performing 
his duties for Defendant. To establish a cause of 
action against Defendant under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, Plaintiff had to prove that 
Defendant was negligent respecting him and that 
this negligence was a legal cause of his injury. The 
Act so provides. Title 45 U. S. C. A. ~ 51. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has consis-
tently so held, and the requirement of negligence 
as a basis of the carrier's liability was not repealed 
by the amendment of the 4th section of the Act, 
Title 45 U. S. C. A. ~ 54, in 1939, which abolished 
the defense of assumption of risk from 'the negli-
gence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of 
such carrier.' Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
335 U. S. 329, 69 S. Ct. 91, 93 L. Ed. ______ ; Wilker-
son v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413. 93 L. 
Ed. ______ ; U rie v. Thompson, Trustee, 337, U. S. 163, 
69 S. Ct. 1018, 93 L. Ed. ______ ; Lillie Y. Thompson, 
Trustee, 332 U. S. 459, 68 S. Ct. 140, 92 L. Ed. 73 ~ 
Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 
333 U. S. 821, 68 S. Ct. 854, 92 L. Ed. 1108; Ellis 
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 329 U. S. 649, 67 S. Ct. 598, 
600, 91 L. Ed. 572, page 576: 'The Act does not 
make the employer the insurer of the safety of his 
employees while they are on duty. The basis of his 
liability is his negligence, not the fact that injuries 
occur.' Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 
7 40, 90 L. Ed. 916; Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. 
Co., 318 U. S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 
A. L. R. 967 ; Tennessee Central Railroad Com-
pany v. Shacklett, 24 Tenn. App. 563, 147 S.W. 
2d 1054." 
"Thus in Webb's Pollock on Torts it is said: 'a 
reasonable man can be guided only by a reasonable 
estimate of probabilities. If men went about to 
guard themselves against every risk to themselves 
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or others 'vhich might by ingenious conjecture be 
conceived as possible, human affairs could not be 
carried on at all. The reasonable man, then, to 
whose ideal behaviour we are to look as the stand-
ard of duty, will neither neglect what he can fore-
cast as probable, nor waste his anxiety on events 
that are barely possible. He will order his precau-
tion by the measure of what appears likely in the 
known course of things.' P. 45. And in the Prosser 
on Torts it is said : 'The idea of risk necessarily 
involves a recognizable danger, based upon some 
knowledge of the existing facts, and some reason-
able belief that harm may follow. A risk is a dan-
ger which is apparent, or should be apparent, to 
one in the position of the actor.' P. 220. Further: 
'In the light of the recognizable risk the conduct, 
to be negligent, must be unreasonable. Nearly all 
acts, of course, carry some remote possibility of 
harm to another, and no man so much as rides a 
horse without some chance of a runaway. The 
risks against which the actor is required to guard 
are those which society recognizes as sufficiently 
great to demand precaution.' P. 221. Thus here 
the Plaintiff's foreman was not negligent in origi-
nally ordering Plaintiff to cut brush, or in ordering 
him to return to that work after Plaintiff com-
plained to him about his condition, unless he ought 
to have known that his orders subjected Plaintiff 
to a risk of harm from the prevailing heat which 
was unreasonable within the meaning of these 
comments.'' 
In the case before this court, the plaintiff was not 
required to remain exposed to the cold any longer than 
he chose. There were two fires near the point where the 
men were working and the men were free, as indicated by 
the evidence, to discontinue their labors at any time and 
go to the fires for the purpose of keeping warm. When 
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the plaintiff did complain of being cold, the foreman sent 
him into the cab of the truck where there was a heater 
and permitted him to operate the truck during the re-
mainder of the shift. It thus appears conclusive that if 
the plaintiff was overexposed at any given time, it was of 
his own choosing. Certainly the railroad is not required 
to advise the plaintiff when he has become ''too cold'' 
and when he should seek shelter or warmth from the fire. 
To do so would require the railroad to act as a guardian 
rather than an employer. 
The plaintiff did not seriously contend that the de-
fendant negligently failed to furnish adequate warming 
facilities. Certainly the plaintiff did not introduce any 
evidence indicating what other warming facilities could 
reasonably have been provided under the circumstances 
and at the time and place where plaintiff was employed. 
The only remaining ground of negligence relied upon by 
the appellant is that of negligently requiring plaintiff to 
work in unusually severe and cold weather over a long 
period of time. 
The undisputed evidence in this case is that all the 
crew available were called out for this particular em-
ployment to repair a condition in the track, over which 
main line freight and passenger equipment operated. 
These men remained at the job longer than a regular 
shift. The defendant has not found any cases "~hich hold 
that requiring employees to '""ork longer than a regular 
shift to repair trackage constitutes negligence. If the 
court finds that the evidence in this case is sufficient to 
permit a jury to find against a railroad on the grounds 
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that the railroad \Yas negligent, it will go further than 
any case \vhich we have been able to find and will be con-
trary to the reasoning of the (Julf, Colorado & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co. supra cited herein. 
As indicated herein, we have cited the only cases 
coming to our attention involving exposure to weather 
in Federal Employers Liability cases. There is an anno-
tation in 32 A. L. R. 904 concerning liability of master for 
injuries to servant from exposure to weather conditions. 
They are not too helpful because the court is concerned 
in most of the cases with the doctrine of assumption of 
risk \vhich is not applicable in the F. E. L.A. case. On the 
issue of negligence the cases do not support a finding of 
negligence unless there is some evidence that the em-
ployee requested some protection from the weather which 
\vas not afforded him. In the instant case, there is no such 
evidence. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS IN-
STRUCTION NO. 2 WHEREBY THE JURY 
WAS INSTRUCTED THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
OXLY RECOURSE FOR COMPENSATION 
FOR HIS INJURIES WAS AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT RAILROAD. 
An identical instruction to that given in the Court's 
Instruction No. 2 "\vas given in ill oore v. The Den.ver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 255, 
292 P. 2d 849. In that case the court also gave an instruc-
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tion on assumption of risk. The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah in reviewing these two instructions said: 
''In some cases, it is conceivable that both or 
either of the instructions might be proper and 
necessary to dispel improper inferences from 
pleadings and evidence. Likewise, in other cases 
the prejudice resulting from the giving of such in-
structions where they were necessary might be 
more capable of definition than in the present case 
. . . It is unnecessary for us to determine whether, 
under the facts of this particular case, the giving 
of these instructions constituted reversible error 
since the case is reversed on other grounds. The 
instructions were improper and should not be 
given in the new trial granted under this opinion.'' 
Following the Moore case supra, it was common for 
the district courts to continue giving the two instructions 
referred to in the JJ1 oore case, notwithstanding the ruling 
in that case. Since the Moore case, plaintff's counsel have 
continued to request both of these instructions and 
did so in the instant case in plaintiff's requested instruc-
tion No. 3. The court refused that part of the requested 
instruction concerning assumption of risk but gave the 
remainder of the instruction as the court's instruction No. 
2. Thus, the jury ,, ... as advised that plaintiff's only re-
course for compensation for his injuries was against the 
Railroad. 
In August, 1961, this Court again considered one of 
these immaterial instructions habitually requested by 
the plaintiff in Siciliano v. The De_nver and Rio Grande 
Western ROJilroad Company, ------ Utah 2d ______ , 364 P. 2d 
413. The court held that giving the instruction on as-
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sumption of risk as given in the Moore case supra. was 
not only error, it was prejudicial error. The Court said: 
''As to the contention that it was prejudicial error 
to iustruct the jury as to assumption of risk, we 
agree. No issue was raised by defendant's plead-
ing on that score, and there was no evidence that 
remotely could have suggested that assuming the 
risk would have prevented recovery here. Nor 
would have been proper an instruction on assump-
tion of risk had this been a case divorced from the 
F. E. L. A. (which specifically eliminates such de-
fense), since the evidence showed conclusively that 
Siciliano had no knowledge of any hazard, such 
knowledge being a necessary factor before assump-
tion of risk can be urged as a defense. 
Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe expressed our disap-
proval of such an instruction where the issue was 
not raised, in Bruner v. McCarthy, but said under 
the circumstances, where negligence had been 
established as a matter of law, it could hardly 
prejudice anyone. In another F. E. L. A. case, 
Moore v. D. R. G. W. RR., Mr. Justice McDonough 
lent emphasis to such disapproval by saying that 
'In the present case, as in the Bruner case, no 
issue of assumption of risk was raised by the 
pleadings or the evidence and no good purpose 
could have been served by the giving of such an 
instruction. In some cases, it is conceivable that 
(the instruction) might be proper and necessary 
to dispel improper inferences from pleadings and 
evidence ... It is unnecessary for us to determine 
whether under the facts of this case the giving of 
the instructions constituted reversible error since 
the case is reversed on other grounds. The instruc-
tions were improper and should not be given in the 
new trial granted under this opinion.' The N e-
braska case of Ellis v. Union Pac. RR. emphasizes 
such disapproval in even stronger language.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
Certainly there can be no contention by appellant 
that there was any issue in the instant case or any infer-
ence drawn which properly raised an issue on the ques-
tion of compensation. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS IN"-
STRUCTION NO. 16 WHICH ADVISED THE 
JURY THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLI-
GENT IF IT FAILED TO SELECT THE 
PROPER TYPE OF MEN AND CRE\\T TO DO 
TI-IE JOB SINCE THERE WAS RO EVI-
DENCE OR CONTENTION THAT THE DE-
FENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THAT 
PARTICULAR. 
In its instruction No. 16, the court instructed the jury 
on an entirely immaterial matter. Notwithstanding that 
there was not any claim or contention that defendant had 
selected an improper type of men or cre\Y to do the job 
plaintiff was employed to do at the time he sustained his 
alleged injury, the court instructed the jury as follows: 
"You are instructed that a railroad is required to 
exercise reasonable care in the selection of the size 
and type of a ere"'" to do work in the repairing and 
maintenance of its tracks. 
If you find that this defendant in this case, con-
sidering the job to be done and the circumstances 
then existing, reasonably failed to select the type 
or number of men to do the job, such failure would 
be negligence on its part. 
Ho,vever, if you find that the defendant Railroad 
acted reasonably under all of the circumstances in 
the selection of the type and number of men to 
make the repair of the open joint, then it cannot 
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be eharged with negligence because of the selection 
of thl~ crew that \vas used." 
There ean be no question that this instruction was 
immaterial. Not even appellant will claim that any issue 
was made as to the type of men employed. Furthermore, 
this immaterial instruction \vas especially prejudicial 
considering the racial background of the employees \vho 
\vere working on the crew with the plaintiff at the time he 
alleged his fingers were frozen. The foreman, J. G. Chro-
nopoulos, is obviously Greek and spoke brokenly. Lee 
Carbjol is Spanish-American. Both were called as wit-
nesses by the defendant and both gave testimony contrary 
to that given by the plaintiff. For this reason, it was espe-
cially prejudicial to invite the jury to consider the imma-
terial question of \vhether these men were the right type 
of employees. This court is aware that some jurors, 
whether justified or not, have racial prejudices, and to 
invite such jurors to exercise their prejudice is not con-
sistent with the best standards of American justice and 
was prejudicial to the rights of this defendant. 
The courts have uniformly held that instructions on 
an immaterial matter constitute error. Whether or not 
the error is prejudicial depends upon the faets and cir-
eumstances. In Ellis v. U. P. R.R., 148 Neb. 515, 27 N.W. 
2d 921, the court in commenting on immaterial instruc-
tions said: 
''In such cases, instructions to the jury should be 
considered together that they may be properly un-
derstood and when, as an entire charge it appears 
they do not limit recoverable negligence to that 
charged in plaintiff's petition, but authorize re-
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covery for negligence generally, they will ordinar-
ily be adjudged to be prejudicially erroneous.'' 
In the instant case, the jury was permitted to find 
the railroad negligent on the immaterial issue that the 
railroad employed the wrong type of men. We believe 
this constituted prejudicial error. 
POINT VI 
A GROSS AWARD OF $20,000 FOR THE 
LOSS OF TWO FINGERS IS SO EXCES-
SIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AS 
TO COMPEL THE CONCLUSION THAT 
THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED BY PAS-
SION AND PREJUDICE IN ASSESSING 
DAMAGES, AND THE TRIAL COURT COM-
MITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN DENY-
ING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
We submit that a finding of $20,000 for the amputa-
tion of two fingers in the instant case, which amputation 
did not impair the plaintiff's ability to continue with his 
employment except for a short period of time, is grossly 
excessive. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit for the reasons stated herein that the 
court should reverse the judgment and direct the court to 
enter judgment in favor of the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON 
Counsel for Appella;nt 
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